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Dedication**
This Article recognizes a true Scot of Viking, not Celtic, origins. His full
name is William Alexander Jardine Watson. From his mother comes the
Jardine, a family that arrived with William the Conqueror and received lands
in Dumfries and Galloway, where the name continues. The clan Jardine's
motto, much to his delight, remains Cave Adsum ("Beware, I am here!"). The
sons of Wat, however, were Norsemen who settled in Aberdeenshire. True to
their Viking tradition, the Watson is still a rover, to be sighted in Singapore,
across North America and Australia, even in South Africa, where Watsons are
most often regarded as Afrikaaners. Alan's prolific scholarship, of course, is
cited throughout the world.
Encountering Alan Watson, in print or in person, creates warm intellectual
adventures. No one works harder at examining a legal text and the ideas
encapsulated in its author's choice of words. He loves to liberate words, as the
table of contents to his first major monograph illustrates. The Law of
Obligations in the Later Roman Republic' initiated the standard of excellence
to which this Article, with its focus on the medieval Icelandic law of
obligation, can only aspire. This hommage, then, acknowledges a debt, viewed
through the bottom of a half-full glass, that is neatest nectar and never a duty.
* Professor of Law and Legal History, Faculty of Law, The University of Manitoba.
** Originally written for the Manitoba/Iceland Partnership Conference, held in Reykjavik
on 16 March 2002, this Article connected directly with Alan Watson's presence in Winnipeg,
12-18 January 2002, as the University of Manitoba's Distinguished Visiting Lecturer.
I ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF OBuGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPuBuc (1965).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Icelandic Sagas and Tales2 bring us Northern Europe's news for the
five centuries after Charlemagne's coronation in 800 A.D. Like much of what
one sees ten centuries later on CNN, that news remains a blend of fiction and
faction, of patriotic propaganda and of unspeakable brutalities.
Each summer in the Sagas brought annual Viking raids, up and down the
coastlines of the North and Baltic Seas, into Saxony, the Irish Sea, down the
English Channel, into the Mediterranean, from Norway to Normandy, Russia
to Sicily. Indeed, enterprising Icelanders made pilgrimages to Rome and
served as mercenaries to Constantinople. The Sagas are full of coastal raiders
returning to Iceland with their loot, like lottery winners, to become respectable
landlords and farmers. Their expeditions had one purpose and two methods:
they wanted what you had, and they would either take it or trade it. Theirs was
a culture based mainly on violence, exchange and enslavement--or so the
Sagas want us to believe. Accurate or not, this scenario left little role for the
rule of law. All of the skull-splitting and blood-spilling pre-empted any
peaceful, orderly debtor-creditor relationships. Vikings left no receipts for
their loot, only the fear of next summer's return.
It may seem silly, then, to seek lawful Icelandic answers to the medieval
question, "why pay your debts?" Modem readers of the Sagas can romanticise
Viking raiders, visualising a defiant Kirk Douglas as Eirik the Red at the prow
of a langskip. English legal historians can grudgingly admire their
Francophone Viking descendants, the Normans. Those Norman conquerors of
England in 1066 had imposed a militarised, landlord feudalism on Anglo-
Saxon society that looked and worked much like the Icelandic society of the
Sagas. After all, Normans and Icelanders shared the same Scandinavian roots.
But where, during the Vikings' earthly and sea-going preludes to their eternal
Valhalla, was there any recognition or need for debt, an attitude of obligation,
a duty of repayment, or a non-violent, rule-governed process for debt-
collecting? We must begin by thinking out loud about what the word "debt"
meant and how it operated in medieval Icelandic society.
This Article cannot answer the factual question of whether medieval
Icelanders actually paid their debts, or what the percentage of default was. The
truth is that the judicial or accounting records required for such a study do not
survive-if they were ever made at the time. Instead, this Article will focus
I Unless otherwise noted all literary accounts are from THE COMPtETE SAGAS OF
ICELANDERS: INCLUDING 49 TALES (Vidar Hreinsson ed., 1997).
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on how debts, in the broadest sense, were created and how debts were
collected, in order to identify motives and results. This Article, then, is only
a first draft attempt to document and explain what is at the heart of the
medieval Icelandic legal system: the law of obligation and its debtor-creditor
relationships, again in the broadest, most pervasive sense.
The original evidence for studying debt in medieval Iceland abundantly
survives in at least four different primary sources: 1. the legal vocabulary,
extracted mainly from the Grdgds, now excellently translated and edited in two
volumes;3 2. the aforementioned Sagas and Tales, now superbly translated and
edited in five volumes by Vidar Hreinsson and colleagues;4 3. the law courts
and their procedures, from Grdlgds I; and, 4. the substantive law of debt itself,
as found mainly in the Grdges II. There is no greater variety and volume of
literary evidence for debt available to us from anywhere else in the medieval
world, not even for England's common law tradition. Let us focus first on the
fascinating Icelandic legal terminology for debt.
1I. MEDIEVAL ICELAND'S LEGAL VOCABULARY
Any definition of the four letter English word, debt, and its equivalent five
letter Icelandic word, skuld, will have to be bigger than its spelling. As with
the Latin noun, debitum, the word in each language's usage contains two levels
of meaning: debt as the thing which one owes, and debt as that which one
ought to do, i.e., make the repayment. The first is debt in the positive and
material sense; the second, however, is moral and immaterial, in the broader,
deeper meaning of duty.'
What was uniquely clear in the medieval Icelandic language was this same
basic distinction, where skuld meant the debt itself and skil meant the duty or
obligation." Thus the debtor, or skuldunautr, was bound by the thing owed
I LAWS OF EARLY ICELAND: GRAGAs I (Haraldur Bessasaon & Robert J. Glendinning eds.,
Andrew Dennis et al. trans., 1980); and LAWS OF EARLY ICELAND: GRAGAS II (Andrew Dennis
et al. eds. & trans., 2000).
4 Supra note 2.
For earlier evidence and analysis on this topic; see DeLloyd J. Guth, The Age of Debt, the
Reformation and English Law, in TUDORRULE AND REVOLUTION: ESSAYS FORG.R. ELTON FROM
His AMERICAN FRIENDS 69-86 (DeLloyd J. Guth & John W. McKenna eds., 1982); and DeLloyd
J. Guth, Centrality of Debt in Western Medieval Sacred and Secular Legal Systems, in
CONTEMPORARY LAW 1994 DROrrCONTEMPORArN 56-67 (H. Patrick Glenn ed., 1995, reprinted
in Jus Ecclesiae, VII, 495-510 (1995).
' All legal vocabulary, see supra note 3, especially GRAGAS 1, 270-6, and GRAGAS II, 405-
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(skuldfastr), by way of a debt made by positive law (16g), hence a ldgskuld.
Beyond this was the second sense of debt as duty or obligation, identified and
enforced by the positive law as 16gskil.
This dualism of skuld and skil generically conceptualised a much more
varied and enriched medieval Icelandic legal vocabulary for debt and duty.
Different technical words identified a debt-creating, duty-creating human
relationship. M, ldagi meant an agreement that defined a debt, gera meant a
court or arbitrated award to be collected, afestamil was a marriage betrothal
agreement, with a mundarmdl as a bride-price agreement. Then there was the
simple b6t, which was the compensation offered or awarded routinely in the
Sagas for killing, maiming and wounding. The word spell, hence spilla,
identified damage for which one owed compensation. The g]f, or gift, went
to someone with the clear intent of binding its receiver's loyalty and friend-
ship. Any hired thing, a leigu, had a hire agreement, or leigumdl. An
inheritance, or arfr, might attract all sorts of debtor-creditor conflicts. Then
there was the legally allowed interest rate, the 16gleiga, and pledged money
(ve6), repayments of money (gfald) and fines, or utlegir, levied by law courts.
And of course every thj6fr, or thief, had stolen goods, or flhi, that could be
recovered by a law-authorised search, or rannsaka.
I. MEDIEVAL ICELAND'S CONCEPT OF DEBT ACCORDING TO THE
SAGAS AND TALES
Medieval Iceland's legal vocabulary suggested a highly sophisticated
routine for recorded activities, instruments, encounters and relationships that
derived from that simple dualism of debt and duty, ofskuld and skil. But when
we shift the focus to our next primary source for law, the Sagas, the news we
get was not about a sophisticated legal system for enforcing debts and duties.
Almost to the contrary, those who gathered and wrote down the Sagas and
Tales, mainly in the thirteenth century, had little or no interest in making the
intricacies of law and the juical processes relevant to everyday life, by which
debts and duties could be peacefully administered. The Saga writers do not
appear to think that one paid debts because law and its enforcement procedures
required it. If the Sagas are giving us the real medieval news of northern
Europe, then that pregnant legal vocabulary seems to be stillborn, and few if
any writers bothered with the niceties of law. The saga writers' pens located
dispute resolution more often on the battlefield than in the courtroom.
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The single most dominant debt-duty activity in the Sagas was produced by
homicide.7 Killing created, in the victim's survivors, the obligation either for
revenge-killing or for collecting the compensation price (b6t), or both. After
Egil Skallagrimsson slaughtered Berg-Onund and his allies in Norway ("almost
chopping his head off'), and prior to returning to the safety of Iceland, he said:
"We fought; I paid no heed that my violent deeds might be repaid."8 The rule
of law intervened, albeit briefly, when Egil was outlawed and again when he
sued Atli the Short in the Gula Assembly for moneys owed from lands
confiscated since his outlawry. Egil then challenged Atli to a duel, killed him,
and was still denied restitution by none other than King Hakon, who had
personally outlawed Egil. Duty, not law and not revenge, then intervened.
Egil's friend Arinbjom gave him the amount of the confiscated debts, out of
his own purse, because ". . . it's my duty to make sure that you are not
deprived of what is yours by law."9 The law had failed and a private remedy
had to be provided.
We can begin to see answers to the question: "why pay your debts"? These
men balanced their own books for their own reasons and basically did so out-
of-court. This particular dispute had begun when Berg-Onund withheld a
portion of an inheritance (arfr) related to Arinbjom, Egil's friend. That
friendship had justified Egil's acting as Arinbjom's agent in killing Berg-
Onund; and the same friendship then justified Arinbjom's payment of Egil's
confiscated land revenues, even though Arinbjom had had nothing to do with
the confiscation or fraudulent conversion of Egil's lands and revenues. This
chain of quid pro quo actions rooted itself in a debt-duty cycle, with no
apologies offered to those who literally lost their heads along the way.
If killing was a commonplace way to create a debt-duty, and kinship or
friendship often a reason for the subsequent revenge-killing, then the gift (gj6J)
was the socially binding cement. There was no free gift in the Sagas. It was
a crucial instrument in manufacturing social ties of friendship, or of acknowl-
edging kinship loyalties, which would bind two individuals for future times of
crises. One major reason for giving gifts was to bend or control the legal
system, to create a loyal band of so-called "thingmen," who would support one
side against the other in petitions to an assembly or with verdicts in a law
I See WILIAM IAN MiLLER, BLOODTAKNG AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW AND SOCIETY
IN SAGA ICELAND (1990); JESSE L. BYOCK, FEUD N THE ICELANDIC SAGA (1982); and WI12iAM
PENCAK, THE CONFLICT OF LAW AND JusTICE IN THE ICELANDIC SAGAS (1995).
I HREINSSON, supra note 2, at 113.
r Id. at 135-36.
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court. In Gisli Sursson's Saga, he made clear that "I don't want to accept these
gifts-I cannot see how they will be repaid."' Gisli knew exactly what he was
doing when he replied: "A gift always looks to be repaid."" And later to
Havard he said: "Here is a gold ring I want you to have," only to be told: "But
it is not a debt I was looking to recover."'" When Gunnar of Greenland sent
a board game (probably chess) and a polar bear to King Harald of Norway, the
royal response was: "This man's gifts are splendid, but what does he want
from us in return?" The answer was: "Quite simply, my lord, your friendship
and wise counsel."' 3 Thorir Field-Beard put it directly: "I will give you gifts
of friendship if you will support me in this matter.""' That was as naked a
bribe as any gift could become. In Nal's Saga, Hrut-who had earlier been
divorced because his wife claimed "his penis is so large" that she could not be
satisfied-proposed that the way to pacify an enemy was to... give him gifts
and he becomes our friend for life.""
Beyond gifts to friends and kinsmen, the "giving" was part of other debt-
duty creating negotiations. Hreidar saw complications when he said that: "I've
got obligations on both sides-you're my friend and he's my brother" but a
third party was related "through marriage." 6 Gifts were also used for marriage
and conflict resolution. Fathers negotiated directly with would-be husbands,
with daughters actively reserving the right to say yes or no. Successful
betrothals (festamd!) and marriages were separately sealed with exchanges of
gifts, such as animals, money, jewelry and domestic items. Similarly, most
out-of-court dispute settlements were effectively plea-bargained on terms that
included exchanges of gifts and compensatory awards. All these gifts created
debts for both parties, owed to each other: who then was the debtor? Who then
was the creditor?
Obviously the debt-duty realities, even if fictional in the Sagas, were much
more complicated than any simple owing of money or of things, based on
conventional sales, loans, purchases, barters, exchanges, written contracts and
oral promises. All anecdotal examples presented above immediately gave rise
to collectable actions of debt and a duty to repay. The Sagas, however, rarely
showed such matters being pursued in any courts and assemblies. This was
t0 11 HREINSSON, supra note 2, at 14.
1, Id. at 18.
1, Id. at 41.
11 III HREINssoN, supra note 2, at 411.
14 IV HREINSSON, supra note 2, at 217.
1S 111 HREINSSON, supra note 2, at 24.
16 11 HREINSSON, supra note 2, at 269, 280.
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especially true for the single most frequent debt-creator, at least according to
the Sagas: the sword and axe swinging, leg chopping, decapitating killer. Most
compensations to be paid to the victim's widow, children, kinsman or friends
were never assessed and ordered by a court of law. When Gunnar acknowl-
edged responsibility for his servants' murder by of Njal's servant, he invited
Njal to self-assess compensation. Njal asked for twelve ounces of silver and
Gunnar paid this to him. Shortly thereafter, Njal's servant killed Gunnar's
servant, and the twelve ounces were returned to Gunnar. In both killings the
saga writer blamed the wives of Njal and Gunnar for ordering the murders.
Njal's wife Bergthora told her sons to "avenge any shame" and Gunnar's wife
Hallgerd demanded that he "avenge his kinsman, or else endure the contempt
of all men."'" The Saga-writer went on to construct the social and legal
message as follows: "Gunnar and Njal said that no matters would ever arise
that they would not settle by themselves. They stuck to this and always
remained friends."'" Where the legal system might fail, personal friendship
prevailed. As in The Saga of the People of Vatnsdal,"9 a private settlement
with compensation was preferable to the public legal process involving
outlawry.
Many killers promptly invited their victim's survivors to name the
compensatory price (b6t), as if to say: I have violently eliminated my problem,
so how can I non-violently eliminate yours, in terms of your loss of the dead
man's future earnings? While the killer's act signified a failure for peaceful
negotiations, once the killing had succeeded, the saga writers tell us that the
b6t was negotiated on the killer's survivor's terms. Apparently most killers
paid whatever the widow, son, daughter, kinsman, or even friend of the victim,
self-assessed the loss to be worth. It remained for the killer, of course, to
decide how much he might actually pay to prevent a revenge-killing. But at this
point the b6t began to function more like a license-to-live for the killer, rather
than as a punishment. This man-price, or wergild, therefore could create
highly negotiable and collectable post-mortem debt-duty relationships, akin
perhaps to our modem world's use of term life insurance policies, payable to
survivors! Thus the killer paid the debt in order to live, and in order to prevent
any revenge-cycle.
'7 III HREINSSON, supra note 2, at 52, 54.
IS id. at 55.
'9 IV HREiNSSON, supra note 2, at 66.
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Often a simple debtor-creditor relationship ended either in a forfeiture of
collateral or in the creditor killing the debtor, settled privately and in avoidance
of any judicial procedure. In the Saga of Thorstein the White, we learn that:
Thorstein [the White] was a generous lender,
and Steinbjorn borrowed so heavily from him
that he ran low on money, until he began to
think his debtor in trouble and his investments
in Steinbjorn unsafe. So he demanded his money
back, and their financial dealings ended with
Steinbjom's handing over the property at Hof
to Thorstein [the White].20
The unpaid money debts, then, forced a mortgaged transfer of the lands and
buildings by way of an out-of-court private settlement.
In another case in the same Saga, however, another Thorstein named the
Fair rode inland to collect from Einar Thorirsson a debt he claimed arose from
a slander. But that was only part of the story. Einar had previously breached
several debt-duty obligations to Thorstein the Fair: abandoning Thorstein, who
was sick with scurvy, and their shipping partnership in Norway; and then
announcing in Iceland that Thorstein was dead in order to break Thorstein's
betrothal to Helga, so that Einar could marry her instead; which he did. When
Thorstein the Fair confronted Einar, he said, "I have come because I want to
know how you intend to compensate me for your making fun of my having
scurvy at sea and for laughing at me with your oarsmen."2' Einar had the
second but not the last laugh, saying: "Go and collect first from all the others
who laughed at you. I will compensate you if all the rest do."' Infuriated,
Thorstein the Fair chased Einar into his bedroom and ran his spear through
him; a most Freudian symbolism, in the marital room with a spear, for the man
who had stolen his bride! Einar's father, Thorir, soon sent a party of seven to
revenge-kill Thorstein the Fair. They managed to kill two brothers of
Thorstein the Fair, while losing three of their own gang, including Thorgils.
Two broken obligations and one slander produced six dead bodies. Thorstein
20 Id. at 303-04.
21 Id. at 307.
2 Id.
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the Fair fled Iceland for five years and "was outlawed for the slaying of Einar"
the following summer.'
He prospered mightily abroad as a raider and trader. Upon his return,
Thorstein the Fair went straight to Thorstein the White, now old and blind,
who--according to the saga writer-"smelled the stench of merchants and
asked who had come." Now the fully private, out-of-court settlement
process, so preferred by all the saga writers, began to unfold. The killer
offered the victim's father "self-judgement for your son Thorgils," meaning
name-your-price for compensation.' The father said "that he had no wish to
have his son Thorgils in a purse... [but also] I don't want to have your head
struck from your shoulders. 'Ears fit best where they grow.' "2 The father
offered to "consider us reconciled," if the killer would move all his wealth into
the father's home at Hof, care for him in his old age and, later, marry Helga,
who the killer had been originally betrothed to and whom he had widowed
when he killed the slandering Einar."
To summarise the saga writers' consensus about debt-duty relationships:
the realities of medieval Icelandic society dictated a 'kill first, pay later'
culture which shamelessly used gift-giving to buy loyalties and which
preferred private, out-of-court settlements.
Assuming that my reading of the 2184 pages of the five volume English
translation is correct, then we must ask if the saga realities are the same as the
legal realities; namely, do the Sagas and Tales coincide with what the Grdgds
prescribed as the laws and procedures governing debt-duty relationships. If the
two realities were the same, then we can be confident about our knowledge of
why medieval Icelanders paid their debts. But if the two realities differed,
perhaps dramatically, then what can we know and who should we believe?
Does the Grdgds only tell us the ideal, what ought to be happening for debt-
duty enforcement? Or, is it the saga writers who are uniformly distorting
reality, either by deliberately cutting the courts out of the picture or at least by
ignoring them and taking their activities for granted? What is ultimately at
stake here is the legal historian's best answer to the core question: medieval
Iceland's commitment to the rule of law and, if so, whose law?




2 Id. at 309-10.
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IV. MEDIEVAL ICELAND'S CONCEPT OF DEBT ACCORDING TO THE GRAG&s
We already know that medieval Iceland had a legal vocabulary that served
the conventional technicalities of the debt-duty relationship. We can safely
assume that such words existed to be used and did not operate in a void. This
brings us, then, to the realities of our third and fourth primary sources for
medieval Icelandic debt: the law courts and their procedures, and the
substantive law of debt itself. Here we arrive at the single most important
collection of medieval laws for all of Europe, the Grdgds. The uniqueness of
the Grdgds was in the simple fact that, unlike all other European states of the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Iceland that produced it had no centralis-
ing kingship, no dynastic nobility, no professionalised group of jurists or
lawyers, no ecclesiastical power competing for political governance, and no
central or even local permanent executive institutions and offices for law
enforcement and fiscal administration. Anyone trained in medieval law and
history must ask: how did the Icelanders manage?
From the University of Manitoba's first volume of the English translation
of the Grdgds, published in 1980, we know the institutional realities.S The
assemblies and courts existed, with well-defined procedural requirements.
They appeared to have been busy at all times. The first debt-duty that they
created was to truth-speaking, in their oath requirement, an obligation to say
"words of honour [that] were [not] wrongly given" and to not give "false
witness."29 Then there were the verdicts of usually twelve jurors, sworn to
determine conflicting issues of fact. Fines and penalties were to be assessed
and paid in the courts, with half going to "the assembly and half to the man
who prosecutes."3 Outlawry, both full and lesser, was the ultimate legal
weapon, for which the single most important law court existed: the Confisca-
tion Court.3 Once the verdict of outlawry was given, "those men who had
money owed them by [the outlaw] . .. are to have called witnesses ... to
provide formal means of proof."32  "Suits concerning money are to be
prepared... just as for a debt court," which "was only held when someone
died leaving debts."33 Most importantly, the Grdgds reinforced the violent
z' GRAGAS I, supra note 3.
29 Id. at 62, 68.
30 Id. at 117.
' Id. at 88-112.
32 Id. at 89-90.
11 Id. at 90.
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imagery and reality of the Sagas by devoting two distinct sections to laws
governing homicide and the wergild, or man-price compensation rules.
Here I can only whet the appetite for knowing more about debt prosecuting
and collecting, but two points are obvious: an elaborate set of institutional
procedures existed to enforce non-violently the debt-duty relationships; and the
saga writers made little significance or record of any of this. While they
occasionally described assembly proceedings, these were almost exclusively
the formalities for outlawing accused killers, after which nothing further was
recorded, i.e., no mention of Confiscation Court proceedings.
Even more to the point, the saga writers simply did not concern themselves
with the substantive law of debt-duty relationships, except in the sorts of
anecdotal examples which I have excerpted from their narratives. But in the
translated edition of Grdg& II, there were separate sections for such debt-duty
matters as the "hire of property," and "on commerce obligations" and "on tithe
payments." Each offered elaborately detailed rules of behavior, which I must
leave to study on my next occasion. Each revealed a level of sophisticated
commercial law unrivalled in the records of the rest of medieval Europe. Each
established beyond doubt that debt-duty relationships were ruled by law, and
not by violence, privately powered settlements, the bribery of gifts, or the
bondage of blood.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In any legal system the debt-duty relationships must be enforceable,
whether in or out of court. The answers to the question, "why pay your
debts?" rest on a wide variety of reasons, intentions and authorities. The first
is usually a positive law requirement: the statute or code commands you. This
plays no role in the Sagas but is important to the Grdgds. The second may be
because the customary law, usually in the oral tradition, expects you to do so
for the sake of community order. This is more important to the Sagas than to
the Grdgds. The third emphasises analogies to past similar cases as prece-
dents, but this approach, which we identify with the English common law, does
not seem to matter either in the Sagas' version of reality or that of the Grdgds.
Fourthly, there is no sign of a religious law requirement for paying your debts
in either of the texts. However, there are occasional hints of morality, of a
consensus about what is right and what is wrong, and about justice and equity,
operating in the Saga narratives regarding debt-duty. In the fifth category is
the conventional reason for paying your debts: a quidpro quo exists, involving
reciprocity and mutual consideration. Similarly, and sixthly, the principle of
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status quo ante requires that the debt-duty relationship be restored or be
returned to what existed prior to it. Seventh, one pays one's debts because of
a recorded promissory commitment, whether oral or literal. There may be
subtleties and nuances in the Sagas to suggest such reasons as quidpro quo
and status quo ante, but they are not as explicit to the narratives as is the naked
promise, on which reputation and honor rest. The Grdgds, however, did not
explain its substantive law of debt-duty in such terms; but there can be little
doubt that it was governed by such prescriptive thinking. The eighth reason
divides the two texts dramatically: brute force is the technique of the Sagas in
which you pay debts under the threat, and then the reality, of violence. This
is exactly what the Grdgds's laws and procedures were designed to prevent.
This brings us to the ninth, and final, element: self-help. The Sagas presented
it as the norm; the Grdgds, out of necessity, institutionalised self-help. This
is because judges and jurors must decide according to the rules of law.
Therefore by using self-help, the courts could then license the winner to go out
and enforce thatjudgment. The self-help system was therefore the result of a
medieval Icelandic legal system that lacked an institutionalised enforcement
bureaucracy, as existed for example, in England through royal officials and an
executory writ system.
Reconciling the legal realities of the Sagas and the Grdgds regarding debt-
duty relationships is a much larger task than this Article can accomplish. Here
I can only offer tentatively my own thematic suggestions and documentary
readings, knowing full well that wiser, more learned scholars precede me,
especially in Iceland but also in North America, like William Ian Miller and
Jesse Byock, and in the three marvelous English translators of the Grdgds,
Andrew Dennis, Peter Foote and Richard Perkins.
There is something majestic and monstrous about the medieval Iceland
portrayed in the Sagas. There is something meticulous and monumental about
the rational order portrayed in the Grdgds. Together they make a wonderful
connective in legal history. Nals Saga, for example, shows that law, and
knowledge of law, were of great importance in Icelandic society but not as
paramount as the blood feud in creating obligations. Alan Watson has read
carefully the Roman sources of law, most notably The Digest of Justinian,3'
which portray a law of obligation that is bloodless, which it never could have
been. Connecting law with social reality must remain a mystery that legal
historians are best equipped to pursue. That is also why the legal historian
1' DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN (Theodore Mormmsen & Paul Krueger, eds., Alan Watson, trans.,
1985).
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owes a debt-duty to combine the literary and legal truths of any culture,
especially one that so beautifully and so uniquely documents an Iceland that
remains a medieval and modem model for the world.

